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By Ann Pettifor

Director, Jubilee Research at the New Economics Foundation, London www.jubileeresearch.org

I know a big tent when I see one,” said President Bill Clinton, after he met with Jubilee 2000 in late 1999. The American president was one of many to highlight the breadth of the debt campaign as one of its greatest strengths. When he hosted his final White House Prayer Breakfast in September 2000, he expanded on this theme: “You know, we have a lot of Democrats who represent inner city districts with people who have roots in these [indebted] countries – allied for the first time in their entire career with conservative, Republican, evangelical Christians who believe they have a moral responsibility to do this, because it's ordained. ... It's given us a coalition that I would give anything to see formed around other issues, and issues here at home – anything.” [1]

As with the French Revolution, so too with the international Jubilee 2000 campaign: it is a little too early to judge its effectiveness.  We know that at the end of 2002 about $34 billion of debts had been written off (instead of the $68bn cancellation promised); and that debt payments by a very few countries has fallen dramatically[2]. In addition there is now a degree of consultation with civil society in debtor nations around so-called “Poverty Reduction” strategies. But these gains may have been offset by a failure to provide enough debt relief to return a single country to sustainability; by the fall in aid flows; and by the IMF’s insistence on using the debt relief programme to deepen and widen their deflationary economic programmes.  So the jury is still out.

However there can be no doubt that Jubilee 2000 was extremely effective in quickly mobilising and uniting a wide range of social forces to place intense global pressure on leaders of the rich countries, and officials in international financial institutions. We were also successful in uniting and maintaining unity among the diverse elements that made up the global social movement for debt cancellation; a movement that had been in existence long before Jubilee 2000 was launched.[3] How did we do that?

First, we looked around for a very simple campaigning objective.  While thinking about this, we were approached by one Martin Dent, who suggested that the coming millennium, linked to the biblical concept of jubilee, might be a suitable framework for a campaign. He was right. The jubilee concept is a profound one: it calls for periodic correction to injustice, by ensuring every seven times seven years, in the fiftieth year (the jubilee year) that debts are written off, slaves freed, and the land restored to its rightful owners. Furthermore the whole of the western world was about to mark the turning of the millennium with big gestures and projects. There could be no bigger, and no more meaningful project than the writing off of the unpayable debts of the poorest countries. So linking these two formed the basis of the campaign.

Second we made a very deep analysis of the problem of unpayable debts. We compare this process to the task of a diamond-cutter; someone who may study a diamond for two years, before cutting the diamond with one confident stroke. We knew that the problem had to be studied in such a way as to produce a multi-faceted analysis that was “true”, as the correct cutting of a diamond reflects its true brilliance. We were wary of the widespread, northern approach: that  “these countries have got their finances into a muddle, lets bail them out”.  But sceptical too of the approach of some in the south, that the north was wholly responsible for the crisis. However, the more we looked into the problem, the more conscious we became of northern culpability. At the same time our partners in the south were urging us not to cancel the debt, for fear that the gains would go into the pockets of corrupt elites.

The formula we came up with, which can be crudely summarised as co-responsibility for the crisis, empowered civil society in both the north and the south. In the north we were able to help campaigners get a grip on export credit guarantees and geo-political lending by their governments. Instead of feeling powerless about what was happening in the south, or in global forums and institutions, they could confront their elected politicians and demand action at home. Similarly in the south, campaigners made the issue of their country’s foreign debts public. Through the churches, trades unions and NGOs,  a wide swathe of society was made aware of the share of government budgets and government assets  being transferred abroad, to much richer creditors.

Finally, we were clear that the civil servants that staff the multilateral institutions were not a major target. Clearly these public officials share responsibility for the crisis, but we were determined to apply pressure on the real decision-makers, their employers or shareholders. These shareholders are the elected politicians of national governments, and we set about ensuring that intense political pressure was brought to bear upon them. By far the most powerful of these are the G7. So we mobilised the first massive anti-globalisation protest at a G7 Summit, the Birmingham Summit of 1998.

Managing a global campaign was not easy. We were aware from the very start that there would be “political” problems; that we would be subject to take-over by far left groups; that the most vocal would likely dominate the campaign; and that there was potential for endless, fruitless and divisive international bickering. So we resolved, consciously, not to form an international committee. Instead, abiding by the principle that global players are best influenced at home, we encouraged all those who wished to support the simple principles outlined in our global petition (for “the cancellation of the unpayable debts of the poorest countries by the year 2000 under a fair and transparent process”) to self-organise at national, and perhaps regional levels.  While we understood the importance of having a common theme; logo and appeal, we were keen for every national campaign to take on a national identity – one which would resonate most widely with the people of that country.  So Jubilee 2000 was never copyrighted; campaigners could use the theme if they so wished; but they could adapt it too. And that is what happened. The German campaign was very different from the Kenyan campaign; and the US campaign took on a very different character from either the highly successful Peruvian, Bolivian, British or Japanese campaigns. But we all shared one simple common aim: to see the debts of the poorest countries written off no later than the year 2000.

In short we tackled global institutions by uniting at a global level around one simple theme: but, while undertaking advocacy at a range of levels, concentrated our energies on change at the national level. In Britain this gave us legitimacy, as we mobilised hundreds of thousands of people around the campaign. Opinion polls registered changes in national public opinion, so that at the end of the campaign we were known to have more than two thirds of British public opinion behind our goal. A CAFOD survey by pollsters MORI in June 2000 showed that 50 per cent recognised the name 'Jubilee 2000' – an astounding figure for a young campaign with no advertising budget. And by the end of the campaign, CAFOD opinion polls were showing that two thirds of the British population supported the goals of our campaign.

The result was that the British Treasury led by Gordon Brown and Tony Blair took a leadership role in international forums. Supported by Bill Clinton and Gerhard Schroder these leaders signed the historic Cologne agreement of 1999 -  to cancel $110bn of debt owed by 41 of the poorest countries.

 “I have witnessed many key moments; perhaps the most significant for me, the point at which I realised that the Jubilee 2000 movement had inspired passion and solidarity the world over – when Gordon Brown confessed that the Treasury, in one month (May 1999), had received over 100,000 postcards urging him to cancel debt. Ruefully the Chancellor added, “...and one of them was from my own mother”.”
Kemal Shaheen, Christian Aid Campaigns Team.

Walking alongside the river in Cologne we came across a small mountain of boxes on the pavement. They were labelled with numbers and place names – 110,000 signatures, Brazil... 333,000 signatures, Bangladesh... and so on. We had all signed the Jubilee 2000 petition, and encouraged Baptists around Britain to do the same. It had seemed the most ordinary of actions. But now as we looked at the boxes drawn together from around the world that simple act took on new significance. Here were the names of the poor and the privileged side by side in a common search for justice, made strong through partnership with one another, and witnessing to a unity that was powerful enough to challenge the prevailing economic structures.”
Graham Sparkes, The Baptist Union of Great Britain.